فقہ اسلامی میں استحسان: اصولی بنیادیں، فقہی مباحث اور معاصر اطلاقات کا تحقیقی جائزہ

ISTIHSAN AS A JURIDICAL PRINCIPLE IN ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE: DOCTRINAL BASIS, SCHOLARLY DEBATES, AND CONTEMPORARY HORIZONS

Abstract

This article examines Istihsan as a juridical principle in Islamic jurisprudence, situating it within both classical scholarship and contemporary legal thought. The central research question guiding the inquiry is: To what extent can Istihsan be considered a legitimate and effective mode of legal reasoning across different historical and modern contexts?

Employing a qualitative methodology, the study draws upon primary texts of uṣūl al-fiqh, the juristic writings of the four Sunni schools, and contemporary Urdu fatwas. While the Qurʾān and Sunnah remain the undisputed primary sources of Islamic law, nearly eighteen secondary sources derive from them, among which Istihsan occupies a distinct and often contested place. The analysis highlights how the Ḥanafīs recognize Istihsan only when firmly anchored in a sharʿī proof, the Mālikīs regard it as a branch of maṣlaḥa mursala, whereas Imām al-Shāfiʿī explicitly rejected its validity, considering it a departure from rigorous legal reasoning.

Moving beyond theoretical debate, the article applies Istihsan to two modern issues: the substitution of endowed properties (istibdāl al-waqf) and the dissolution of marriage (tanṣīkh). These case studies, examined through both classical juristic formulations and contemporary fatwas, demonstrate the principle’s enduring applicability.

The findings suggest that although Istihsan remains a point of divergence among the classical schools, it serves as a dynamic instrument capable of mediating between strict textual fidelity and the practical demands of evolving human circumstances. Properly employed, it reflects both continuity with tradition and adaptability to new challenges, thereby underscoring its relevance in contemporary Islamic legal discourse.