



MINORITY RIGHTS IN ISLAM: ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS, PROPHETIC PRACTICE, AND JURISTIC REINTERPRETATION

Dr. Imran Hayat

Lecturer, Department of Islamic Studies, Division of Islamic and Oriental Learning,
University of Education, Lower Mall Campus, Lahore, Pakistan

imran.hayat@ue.edu.pk,

<https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0647-0989>

Abstract

This article examines minority rights in Islam through the analysis of the Qur'ānic principles, Prophetic practice, and contemporary juristic discourse. It argues that the protection of religious minorities is not a marginal concern but a core ethical obligation. Discussions on Islam and pluralism evaluate the tradition through the lens of minority rights, relying on selective historical practices or politicized interpretations of the past. Such approaches risk confusing the normative ethical foundations rooted within Islamic revelation and jurisprudence. This study employs a qualitative, normative-analytical methodology and it engages classical Qur'ānic exegesis, Prophetic practices, and modern maqāsid-based interpretations to explore how Islamic law conceptualizes justice, human dignity, and religious freedom in plural societies. The analysis determines that while classical juridical frameworks such as the dhimma system were shaped by pre-modern political contexts, their underlying ethical objectives—justice, security, and social harmony remain normatively binding. Modern juristic discourse prioritizes these objectives in articulating models of citizenship and legal equality suited to present nation-states. By combining foundational texts with evolving juristic reasoning, this study contributes to Islamic legal and ethical scholarship by offering a principled framework for minority rights based on Islamic moral philosophy rather than historical legal forms.

Keywords

Minority Rights in Islam; Quranic Ethics; Sunnah and Pluralism; *Ahl al -Dhimma*; *Maqasid al Shariah*; Religious Freedom; Islamic Jurisprudence

Introduction

The issues of minority rights have taken a new resolution in the modern world discourse, especially when it comes to Islam and Muslim nations. In the context of religious pluralism, the rule of nation-states, and the human rights standards, the treatment of religious minorities by Islam is often questioned. A large part of this criticism, however, seems to be based on selective historical interpretations, politicised accounts, or single legal decision-making that is not necessarily viewed in relation to its ethical and juristic contexts. These methods tend to ignore the normative foundations of the Islamic thought that are profoundly based in the Quranic ethic, Prophetic practice, and a tradition of juristic which is justice-focused, human dignity-focused, and social harmony-focused. The essential aspect of the Islamic moral worldview is the confirmation of innate human dignity. The Quran states, *وَلَقَدْ كَرَّمْنَا بَنِي آدَمَ* We have honoured the children of Adam. (17:70), a verse that classical exegetes have always understood as the universal statement of all human beings, regardless of whether they are religious or not. This honour (كرامة), according to Ibn Asuhur, is a principle on which ethical and legal responsibility is based and he says that it comes before and above communal differences (al-Tahrir wa al-Tanwir). This vision of the Universalist morality as a challenge to reductionist descriptions of Islamic law as either solely communitarian or solely exclusionary is a vital source of ethical perspective through which minority rights are viewed. Quran also puts religious diversity in the context of divine will as opposed to human failure. As the holy Quran says: *وَلَوْ شَاءَ رَبُّكَ لَجَعَلَ النَّاسَ أُمَّةً وَاحِدَةً وَلَا يَزَالُونَ مُخْتَلِفِينَ* Instead, He would have made the man one community had your Lord willed, and they still are various (11:118).



Classical commentators like al-Razi take this verse as recognition of plurality as something real that requires one to act ethically and not forcefully with similarity (Tafsir al-Kabir). The categorical Quranic principle, لَا إِكْرَاهَ فِي الدِّينِ ۗ There is no compulsion in religion (2:256) is the reinforcement of this moral orientation, the exegetes (especially al-Tabari) consider as a normative injunction in the very nature of faith as a voluntary moral commitment. Combined, the verses create a Quranic ethic of affirmation of difference but with a requirement of justice and moderate course in inter-religious guidelines.

The Prophetic Sunnah is a real form of these ethical commitments historically. The Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) presided over a pluralistic society, characterized by religion in Madinah and gave clear moral warnings against unfairness treatment to non-Muslims. His statement, which is most frequently quoted, is the following:

عَنْ رَسُولِ اللَّهِ ﷺ قَالَ " أَلَا مَنْ ظَلَمَ مَعَاهِدًا أَوْ انْتَقَصَهُ أَوْ كَلَّفَهُ فَوْقَ طَاقَتِهِ أَوْ أَخَذَ مِنْهُ شَيْئًا بَغَيْرِ طَيْبِ نَفْسٍ فَأَنَا حَاجِبُهُ يَوْمَ الْقِيَامَةِ "

Whoever acts wrongly against a person subject to covenant, takes away his right, or imposes on him beyond his ability, I will be his enemy on the Resurrection Day (reported by Sunan Abi Dawud 3052). Classical jurists interpreted this statement to mean that the protection of minorities was not a political requirement, but a religious obligation before Allah. Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani must have pointed out that the amount of this warning emphasized the sanctity of the non-Muslim rights under the dominion of the Muslims (Fath al-Bari). These Prophetic models make it more difficult to make allegations that the Islamic tradition justifies systematic injustice against religious minorities.

In spite of such powerful ethical foundations, classical Islamic jurisprudence produced legal systems the most famous being the dhimma system which were influenced by the socio-political realities of pre-modern empires. Although these models, including jurists like Abu Hanifa and Malik, focused on safeguarding life, property, and the practice of religion, hierarchical differentiations. Aside, contemporary scholarship has been questioning more whether these forms of law should be considered as normative ideals or as situational mechanisms. Even in classical fiqh, ethical protection, and not subjugation, is put in the spotlight when al-Qarafi asserts that hurting a *dhimmi* is a breach of the covenant between God and His people (al-Furuq).

The key research gap is formed in the cross-section of ethical universality and historical law. A lot of modern literature either upholds the categories of classical fiqh without being adequately placed in any context or rejects it in favour of the modern discourse of human rights. The unexplored area, however, is a methodical re-ethical read that would help make the difference between moral goals, which are not historically dependent, and the legal frameworks based on historical occurrences. The attempts at filling this gap have been made in recent juristic methods based on maqasid al-shari-ah, and emphasise justice, welfare and human dignity above formal continuity of law. Al-Shatibi has become well known in arguing that the purpose of the law being revealed was to bring good and avert evil (al-Muwafaqat), and this principle is now employed by contemporary proponents of equal citizenry and minority rights.

This paper claims that the rights of the minority in Islam cannot be comprehended within a single legal decision or throughout its history, but in a comprehensive ethical guidance based on Quran values, Prophetic practice and juristic explanations. Through the critical analysis of the basic texts and the current discourse of scholars, the study aims to prove that the Islamic concept of moral commitment to justice and human dignity can offer a logical Islamic ground on the protection of the minorities in the modern pluralistic societies. Thus, it has been found



to contribute to the existing discussions by providing an ethical-juristic synthesis beyond apologetics and literal historical interpretations to a principled and contextually sensitive interpretation of minority rights in Islam.

Literature Review

The field of academic study of minority rights in Islam has a range of classical exegetical traditions, interpretations of juristic and modern ethical reconsiderations. Quite on the contrary, the questions of pluralism, justice and minority protection are also a part of the Islamic normative literature. However, the literature has shown a high level of methodological differences between the question of whether minority rights should be based mostly on historical legal terms or rather on more general moral standards. In this respect, this review is a critical analysis of the key strands of scholarship, defining the points of convergence, tension, and under-theorized areas.

Classical Quranic commentary always sets and grounds human dignity and moral responsibility as cross-cutting categories that are universal. In his commentary on verse 17:70, We have honored the children of Adam - Ibn 'Ashur argues that the idea of the human honour (كرامة) is not conditioned by any specific confession, but it is an inherent feature of humanity in general (Ibn 'Ashur, 2000). He also believes that this principle offers the moral foundations on which legal duties are based, as opposed to being a moral advice added on. Equally, the exegesis of religious plurality by al-Razi preempts the intentionality of the divine versus deviance. In his commentary on verse 11:118, as follows, - Had your Lord willed, He would have made mankind one community - al-Razi asserts that plurality is an unchanging aspect of human life, which in turn necessitates the rule of a just and ethical government, and not the use of force (al-Razi, 1981). This reading position challenges later reductionist interpretations which equate unity with uniformity.

Classical insights have been developed in contemporary Quranic scholarship, and through the insights, the development of their ethical implications. According to scholars, verses that guide the admonitions to humanity as a whole (يا ايها الناس) tend to come before universal moral injunctions particularly the ones that deal with justice and fairness (Kamali, 2010). Verse 5:8, which says, وَلَا يَجْرِمَنَّكُمْ شَنَاٰنُ قَوْمٍ عَلٰٓى اَلَّا تَعْدِلُوْاۙ اَعْدِلُوْا هُوَ اَقْرَبُ لِلتَّقْوٰى, 'Do not let the hatred of a people make you forbear justice' is often used to show that Islamic ethics set moral requirements that supersede communal boundaries. Although such a consensus exists, the bodies of literature are still differing as to whether Qur'anic ethics are enough to offer adequate grounding to the contemporary minority rights or whether they have to be juridically articulated. This tension is not resolved and it runs into further debates of the Sunnah.

Prophetic Practice and Protection of Normativity

A significant place in the scholarly literature on minority rights is held by prophetic practices. Another early expression of political pluralism is the Constitution (Charter) of Medina, which acknowledged both Jews and Muslims as members of a common political community, but retained a religious difference (Hamidullah, 1985). Nevertheless, the meaning of the Charter among the scholars is disputed because they may see the Charter as a historically dependent treaty or as a normative constitutional prototype. The morality of the minority protection is further enhanced in the Hadith literature. The most quoted, the narration, Whoever wrongs one who is under covenant... I shall be his enemy on the resurrection day (Abu Dawud) is understood by the jurists to have instituted legal as well as eschatological responsibility. According to Ibn Hajar, the fact that the Prophet assumed a hostile position highlights the seriousness of the injustice against the non-Muslims under Muslim care (Fath al-Bari, vol.4,



p.204). This ethical clarity is often contrasted in modern authors with the juristic inflexibility that follows it. Although Prophetic practice values protection and dignity, subsequent codifications of the law are at times based more on the political hierarchies than on universal moral values. This deviation is the subject of the modern criticism.

Dhimma Framework and Classical *Fiqh*

The *dhimma* system was a legal system, which was developed by classical Islamic jurisprudence to help control the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims in imperial settings. Such jurists as Abu Hanifa and Malik stressed the sacredness of non-Muslim lives, property, and worship, often describing the *dhimma* as an agreement of covenant (عقد) and not a status of subordination. Al-Qarafi is credited with the well-known warning that any harm to a dhimmi is a breach of the divine protection and he wrote: Whoever wrongs him is one who has broken the covenant of God and his Messenger (al-Furuq, vol. 3, p. 14). Modern researchers often use this text to refute the arguments according to which classical *fiqh* justified abuse. However, critical scholarship recognizes that the *dhimma* policies adopted social stratifications that are indicative of the pre-modern rule. According to Hallaq (2009), classical *fiqh*, however, must be interpreted as a contextually-based legal tradition and not a political template. This view has been spread among scholars who attempt to differentiate ethical goals and contingent types of laws.

Modern Juristic Reinterpretations and Maqasid-Based Reinterpretations

The concept of *maqasid al-shariah* is becoming a popular form of Islamic legal reasoning with respect to the resolution of minority rights in modern nation-states. The claim of Al-Shatibi that the law is meant to promote the good and deter the bad (al-Muwafaqat) has been rebranded to put justice, dignity and the common good higher than sheer legal continuity. Al-Qaradawi states that there is no contradiction between equal citizenship and the Islamic principles as long as it is used to achieve the ethical goals of the law (Al-Qaradawi, 1997). Similarly, al-Alwani argues that jurisprudence of the minorities should be interpreted as the continuation of the overall moral project of Islam and not as an extension of the historical hierarchies (Al-Alwani, 2003). Such reasoning may be too abstract, warns the critics, unless it is grounded on textual authority. This discussion highlights one of the critical gaps in the literature, namely, can the ethical purposes be lawfully used to restructure legal categories, without causing juristic continuity?

The predominance of classical and contemporary research is that Islam does not deny justice, dignity and safeguarding of religious minorities. The controversy is not about the values, but the legal expression of the values. A lot of the literature has been descriptive of classical models or promotes reform with lack of ethical synthesis.

Methodology

The research approach of this study is qualitative, normative-analytical to investigate the conceptual basis and the juristic history of the minority rights in Islam. Since the topic relates to the ethics, legal argument and interpretative tradition based on the religious literature, the interpretive textual approach is the most suitable one. Instead of basing the research on empirical or quantitative information, it is based on the analysis of authoritative sources of Islam and the academic discussion to determine the normative patterns, moral commitments, and juristic reasoning applicable to the minority protection. The Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (ﷺ) are the main sources used in this study as they make up the standard normative system of Islamic law and ethics. The interpretation of Quranic verses on dignity of human beings, justice, religious freedom and pluralism are studied in terms of classical tafsir with special reference on the works of al-Tabari, al-Razi, al-Qurtubi and Ibn Ashur.



These exegetical sources have been chosen due to their methodological rigor and long-term scholarly authority and their representative diversity of the approaches to the interpretation in Sunni Islam. Prophetic reports on the treatment of non-Muslims are examined in the light of their juristic reception, in terms of how the classical scholars perceived their legal and moral consequences, not conducting independent hadith authentication.

Besides the foundational works, this work critically addresses classical juristic literature (fiqh) and especially debate on dhimma, protection (aman) and legal obligation. The writings of jurists like Abu Hanifa, Malik, al-Shafi and al-Qarafi are not analysed as fixed legal texts, but rather as historical situated reactions to the socio-political reality of pre-modern Muslim polities. This contextual interpretation allows the distinction to be made between the long-term ethical goals and short-lived legal tools, which is the core of the analytical scheme of the study. The methodological approach also involves modern Islamic jurisprudential study which uses maqdis al-shar.i.ah as a way of interpretation. In the analysis of modern mobilization of ethical goals that should be employed in ensuring the rights of minorities in a modern nation-state, contemporary scholars, including al-Shatibi (in his theoretical formulation), Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Taha Jabir al-Alwani, are examined. Instead of embracing these positions blindly, the paper assesses the consistency of these positions with foundational texts as well as classical principles of justice.

The study is analytically comparative and synthetic in nature. It finds areas of convergence and conflict between the Quran ethics, Prophetic practice, classical fiqh and modern reinterpretations. This permits a multi-layered approach that avoids rejecting historical jurisprudence and does not consider it as unchangeable. The research does not promote a particular form of politics but attempts to express normative principles that can be used to inform ethical and legal reasoning in various plural societies. Lastly, the study is specifically narrowed down to Sunni Islamic jurisprudence and does not purport to represent the exhaustion of Shiite legal viewpoints or local legal jurisdictions. This weakness is methodological in nature and the approach of the study to conceptual coherence, and not encyclopedic coverage. Within this narrow objective, the study will offer a principled and scholarly based input to the current discussions on minority rights in Islamic legal and ethical philosophy.

Findings

The conceptual analysis of Qur'anic texts, Prophetic practice, classical juristic discourse and modern scholarship produces a collection of mutually enclosed results that explain why the minority rights are normatively incorporated into the Islamic thought without being closed to the juristic development. These results show consistency at the ethical principles level as well as versatility at the legal articulation level. The Islamic Minority Rights are not created Obvious on the Juristic Exception but on the Ethical Universals. One of the main conclusions of this paper is that the rights of the minority according to Islam are not based on the principles of legal accommodation and political expediency but rather on the universal ethical imperatives, which are established in the Quran as the justice (عدل), human dignity (كرامة), and moral responsibility (تكليف). The verses which prescribe justice even in the state of enmity (Qur'an 5:8) provide a standard of morality that comes before the category of juridical classification.

This universality is enforced by the classical exegetical interpretations. The fact that Ibn e Ashur has addressed human dignity as an occupational ethical value, but instead of a circumstantial one, reveals that the moral value is ontological before legal status. This discovery conflicts with the readings which view the protection of minorities as a concession



by Muslim authority, instead of a religious duty imposed on this authority. This leads to the emergence of minority rights in Islam as normative needs based on revelation and not history based derivatives of governance.

The Sunnah Translates the Ethics into the binding Moral Accountability

The analysis also reveals that the Prophetic Sunnah puts the ethics of the Quran to practical use in terms of moral and legal responsibility. Threats of retaliation against non-Muslims who are covenantal do not simply express social values, but create eschatological penalties to injustice. The fact that the Prophet (ﷺ) said he would become an opponent to those who are wrong, indicates a transition towards moral exhortation of an abstract nature to enforced moral responsibility. The given finding highlights a key difference, where later systems of jurisprudence codified relations between minorities, the Sunnah considers the protection of minorities as a question of religious fidelity and responsibility to God. The behavior of the Prophet (ﷺ) in Madinah especially his acknowledgment of the non-Muslims as members of the political community demonstrates that ethical inclusion was not a pre-condition to conversion or assimilation. In place of this, coexistence was organized on the basis of justice, trust and covenantal duty.

Classical Fiqh

One of the major conclusions that arise as a result of studying classical fiqh is the difference between the intent and form of ethics. Juristic debates on *dhimma* always have the focus on protection (حماية), security (امان), and religious self-determination. The moral seriousness of the protection of the minority in classical jurisprudence is reflected in statements like that of al-Qarafi when he claimed that the violation of the rights of a *dhimmi* was a violation of the covenant between God and man. Nonetheless, the paper also highlights that the classical legal orders had encompassed hierarchical differences that were indicative of the pre-modern imperial rule. Such differences were indirectly not peculiar to the Islamic law but were features of world legal systems before the advent of modern egalitarian citizenship. Notably, the literature fails to show that these hierarchies were introduced as theological ideals; in fact, it acted as an administrative system in particular historical circumstances. What this discovery suggests is the critical though just reading of classical fiqh: its ethical purposes are normatively important, but its legal forms need to be assessed contextually. *Dhimma* as an unquestionable religious directive or as a system that is fundamentally oppressive is not sufficient to reflect its juridical ambiguity.

The contemporary juristic discourse reinvigorates the minority rights in the ethical objectives. According to the analysis, there was a strong move in the modern Islamic legalized thought to reasoning based on *ma-aashid*. There is a growing academic argument among the community that justice, public welfare and human dignity are the main factors that are to be used to judge the legal decisions in the changing social settings. This change does not criticize classical jurisprudence, it is re-organized in a broader ethical context. The fact that Al-Qaradawi argued that equal citizenship is not incompatible with Islamic principles demonstrates that he tried to operationalise universal ethical concepts in a modern legal system. Simultaneously, the nature of Islam as a moral project and not a fixed political order, which is described by al-Alwani, reflects a growing recognition that the historical forms of the law might not be directly and unchangeably extended to modern nation-states. There is extensive moral agreement in the face of different juristic standpoints. There is a strong consensus between classical and modern scholars on the basis of values: justice, preserving life and property, freedom of religion and social stability. The only point of disagreement is at the institutionalisation level as opposed to principle. This observation disperses arguments that



Islamic scholarship is essentially split concerning minority rights. Rather, the split is manifested as plural responses to different socio-political realities through methodological approaches. Juristic pluralism does not weaken the coherence, but proves the flexibility of the Islamic legal reasoning provided that the ethical goals are pursued.

Lastly, the paper determines the existence of an ongoing conflict between normative ethics and legal formalism as the key issue in the definition of the minority rights in Islam today. Both methods which give priority to historical categories of law run the risk of ethical stagnation, and methods which give priority to ethics run the risk of normativity without juristic discipline. The results indicate that an ethically sound synthesis, based on Quranic ethics and practiced in Prophetic life, educated by classical jurisprudence and assisted by ma other-wise, is a precondition to an Islamic framework of minority rights. A synthesis of this nature will allow the Islamic law to be loyal to its moral origins and is still able to respond to the modern plural realities.

Discussion

The conclusions of the present paper suggest a re-definition of the concept of minority rights in Islam, both in the academic literature and in the popular opinion. Instead of considering the protection of minorities as a past exception or a contemporary compromise, the analysis shows that it is highly introduced in the normative ethics of Islam. This undermines the standard accounts, be they critical or apologetic, which ignore both the Islamic legal tradition as a whole and those parts that have been selectively modernised. By placing ethics as the main site of normativity in the fore, the discussion shifts the debate out of the legal forms to the moral purposes.

Minority Rights and Ethical grounds of Islamic Law

The identification of Qur'anic ethics as supra-legal norms that limit and regulate juristic reasoning is also one of the most important implications of the findings. Justice (‘adl) and human dignity (karamah) are not abstract notions but working concepts which shape the legal accountability within the boundaries of community. According to scholars like Kamali (2010), these values form the moral centrality of the Islamic law and determine how the Islamic law is applied even in situations where explicit ruling of the law may be inconsistent in various situations. This view debunks interpretations that consider minority rights as privileges of Muslim authority that may be given and not imposed. The insistence of the Quran on justice even to those who are hostile (Qur'an 5:8) adds to exclusivist interpretations of the Islamic law. Islamic legal tradition cannot be limited to positive law and according to Hallaq (2009), they cannot be separated since they are inseparable with a moral vision that is before codification. The moral universality noted in the results therefore forms an imperative approach to evaluate the classical and contemporary legal constructions.

Prophetic Practice and the Frontier of Legal Formalism

The Prophetic Sunnah as emphasized in the findings is very important in bridging ideals of ethics and the practice of law. The warnings given by the Prophet against the abuse of non-Muslims under covenant create some sort of moral responsibility that is not enforced by the institutions. This aspect is frequently understated in legalistic approaches to the issue of minority rights since they rely on status classifications instead of moral accountability. Like Ramadan (2009), other scholars note that the ethic of relational justice and its covenantal-based (عہد) approach was evident in the conduct of the Prophet (ﷺ) in Madīnah, not domination. In this sense, the Sunnah does not only play a role of providing individual rulings, but it is rather a moral guide that restrains the boundaries of legal formalism. The



results therefore indicate that any modern-day Islamic framework of minority rights needs to reclaim this Prophetic ethic otherwise justice is reduced to a procedural compliance.

Classical fiqh, Dhimma and Historical contextualisation

The argument of classical fiqh indicates the significance of situational reading without moral rejection. Historically predetermined, the dhimma system was supported by a high level of moral dedication to protection and safety. Theorists like al-Qaraf also expressed this conviction using unambiguous words and terms, positioning the attack on non-Muslims as a betrayal of divine trust. Contemporary criticisms which ignore this ethical aspect are prone to anachronism (Hallaq, 2013). Meanwhile, the results confirm that classical legal hierarchies cannot be blindly applied to the contemporary settings. Moosa (2015) notes that the imperial forms of governance that dominated the pre-modern juristic categories were quite fundamentally different to the modern nation-states. The question, then, is not whether or not to retain or even discard classical fiqh but rather how to distinguish between the classical fiqh on the one hand and its historically specific mechanisms on the other.

Citizenship, Equality and Current Juristic Responses

Although most scholars present these two issues to uphold justice, public welfare, and human dignity, scholars like al-Qaradawi (1997) allege that, in a normative way, the idea of equal citizenship of the religious minorities under the Islamic law can be justified. This is a reformulation of citizenship which is more of a secular edict but a contemporary legal signifying the Islamic moral promises. Nevertheless, critics still state that maqasid reasoning should be limited by a textual and juridical approach of discipline to prevent ethical subjectivism (Auda, 2008). Empirical evidence shows that the maqasid works best when used as a mediation structure, not occupying the place of classical jurisprudence, but making it impossible to alter over time. In line with this, this equitable practice is what maintains juridical continuity and leaves the room to allow ethical goals to guide the formation of the law.

Pluralism, Juristic Diversity, and Ethical Consensus

One of the key input of the work is the emphasis on the ethical consensus in the face of juristic diversity. In spite of the differences in methodology, researchers in the past and in the present agree on the ethical necessity of fairness and defense of minorities. Juristic pluralism, in its turn, cannot be discussed as normative confusion but rather as the manifestation of adaptive reason in the context of a common horizon of ethical values. This observation carries far-reaching consequences in the modern plural societies. It states that there are internal resources of Islamic legal tradition to work with diversity without denying its normative requirements. In this sense, the discussion about minority rights can no longer be divided into the binary of tradition versus modernity but rather the Islamic moral philosophy should be approached with a more precise approach.

The debate eventually leads to the necessity of ethical-juristic synthesis on the expression of minority rights in Islam. Both legal formalism and abstract ethical universalism cannot offer a consistent framework on their own. Rather, this is an ethos of a principled combination of Qur'anic ethics, Prophetic practice, classical jurisprudence, and maqasid-oriented reasoning, which provides the most solid way forward. This type of synthesis confirms that minority rights do not exist outside of the Islamic law but as part of its moral vision. With a legal rationale based on this ethical cornerstone, Islamic jurisprudence is able to address the challenges of the modern plural reality with relevance and, at the same time, be loyal to its intellectual and spiritual tradition.

Conclusion



This paper has endeavored to discuss the rights of the minority in Islam by a thorough interaction of the Quran ethics, the practice of the Prophet, classical jurisprudence and the current juristic debate. Based on rejection of both selective historical interpretation and legal formalism, the analysis shows that minority protection is not an ad hoc or peripheral issue in the Islamic tradition, but one of normative ethical imperative with its roots in the very sources of the Islamic religion. Justice, human dignity, and moral responsibility are developed as some of the key values which guide the reasonings of Islamic law over time and context. The results highlight the fact that Quran sets the moral universal vision where dignity is inherent to all human beings and justice is obligatory regardless of religious affiliation. These moral requirements are not only idealistic but work as limitations to law and act as directives to the operation of law. These values are further translated into binding moral responsibility by the Prophetic Sunnah, and injustice against non-Muslims is put in terms of covenant breach and eschatological qualification. These sources combined demonstrate a continuum of ethics that opposes the views of the Islamic law as exclusionary in nature.

In juristic level, the paper underscores the need of putting classical legal schemes like dhimma into context. Although these frameworks were informed by the socio political realities of the pre modern governments, these were supported by high ethical devotions to safeguarding and societal stability. This is the difference that can be recognized with the aim of critical engagement that would neither idealize nor reject classical jurisprudence. Rather, it confirms the timeless relevance of its ethical goals and recognizes the presence of the juridical evolution in the modern situations. Somewhat recent developments in the maqasid based school of thought include maqasid based approaches to modifying the Islamic legal thinking, with internal tools to solve modern dilemma like citizenship, legal equality and pluralism. The research is relevant to the subject of study, as it shows that these strategies, supported with the primary readings and classical arguments, could offer a coherent Islamic paradigm of minority rights without breaking the connection with tradition. The maqasid-based reasoning, which focuses on ethical purposes, in contrast to historical versions of law, allows Islamic jurisprudence to be consistent with contemporary moral imperatives that plural societies require.

The main contribution of this article is that it has an integrative analytical framework. The study synthesizes rather than addressing Qur'anic ethics, Prophetic practice, classical fiqh and contemporary discourse as conflicting paradigms into a single model of ethics and juristic practice. This strategy transcends the apologetic defenses and critical dismissals to provide instead a principled account of minority rights in Islam that is based on a certain degree of academic foundations. However, there are some limitations to the study. The normative analytic is maintained and does not take empirical case studies of the contemporary Muslim societies. Future studies can fill these gaps by comparing the practice of sectarianism, comparing the way the constitutions reflected in Muslim-majority states, or combining sociological evidence with ethical-juristic reasoning. The Islamic minority rights should not be seen as a compromise based on the need to have a political solution in a particular situation, but rather, they are based on the moral view of justice, dignity, and a harmonious coexistence. The restoration of this ethical basis and its mobilization by way of rigorous juristic thinking, the Islamic legal thought has the intellectual resources to make a valuable contribution to the current debates regarding pluralism and human rights.

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